[Dev] Tizen 3.0 proposal for fixing OSP/WRT/Core hard-coded UID issue

Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen at intel.com
Wed Oct 9 10:42:01 GMT 2013

On Tue, 8 Oct 2013, Dominig ar Foll (Intel OTC) wrote:
>       - AMD receives the launch request from different users and
>       identifies the caller information by reading socket
>       (SO_PEERCRED). This information is passed to launchpad daemon
>       by bundle with AUL_K_UID and AUL_K_GID.
> Getting the correct ID is a first step, you also need to set the
> same environment before lauching the App, in particular the $HOME
> $DISPLAY and D-Bus session. SO_PEERCRED provides the information
> needed to get the caller ENV via /proc/PID/environ

Is SO_PEERCRED reliable mechanism in our environment? I just remembered
from Harmattan times that there was some raciness in it.

You could basically create a program that sends for example a DBUS message
that it does not have privileges and then quickly exec something that has
higher priviledge.

This exploit was actually also demonstrated back then so the race condition
is real.


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